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SYMPOSIUM ON AMARTYA SEN'S
PHILOSOPHY: 3
SEN AND CONSEQUENTIALISM
T. M. SCANLON
Harvard University
It is a particular pleasure to be able to participate in this symposium in
honor of Amartya Sen. We agree on a wide range of topics, but I will
focus here on an area of relative disagreement. Sen is much more
attracted to consequentialism than I am, and the main topic of my paper
will be the particular version of consequentialism that he has articulated
and the reasons why he is drawn to this view.
Let me begin by distinguishing two forms of consequentialism. What
I will call Foundational Consequentialism starts with some notion of
value and explains notions such as right, wrong, rights, duty and
obligation in terms of the production of the best states of affairs as
measured by this standard. By contrast, Representational Consequenti-
alism starts with widely shared intuitions about right and wrong, and
shows how a conception of value can be constructed so that these
intuitions can be squared with the thesis that an act is right if and only if
it is productive of the best consequences.
The motivation for these is quite different, as is their likely content.
The explanatory and justificatory aims of Foundational Consequenti-
alism provide strong reason for keeping its conception of value free of
deontic notions such as rights and duties, since this form of the view
arises from the idea that these notions are in need of explanation and
justification. This form of consequentialism might be taken to start from
the belief that the idea of `the good' has clearer and more obvious
justificatory force than `the right'. The idea is that even before any
particular notion of the good is specified, it is obvious that we have
strong reason to promote the good, but that, by contrast, it is unclear
why we should be concerned not to violate principles of rightness,
especially insofar as this requires something different from promoting
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the good and can even conflict with it. Something like this is often
maintained, I believe, but it is unclear to me at least why it should be
thought true. Perhaps it seems true because `good' is understood in a
`buck-passing' sense (Scanlon 1998, pp. 95±100) as `whatever we have
reason to promote', whereas `rightness' is presented in the form of
certain specific requirements considered in abstraction from any expla-
nation of why they should be reason-giving.
However this may be, I believe that the case for Foundational
Consequentialism is stronger when it is not based on this abstract idea of
the good but rather on some specific notion of value that seems to have
distinctive normative force. Thus, although consequentialism is nowa-
days often presented in an abstract form, leaving the notion of the good
unspecified (as in Kagan, 1989, p. 60), I believe that it is utilitarianism
that exhibits most clearly the appeal of the Foundational version of the
view.
As Sen says, utilitarianism can be seen as the conjunction of three
theses: (1) consequentialism, according to which the rightness of actions
depends on the value of the states of affairs they produce; (2) welfarism,
according to which the value of a state of affairs is a function of the
welfare of individuals; and (3) sum-ranking, according to which this
function is additive. Although these theses are logically independent, it
seems to me that their appeal is not independent, and that in fact it is
welfarism (or, historically, hedonism) that provides the support for the
other two. Although hedonism does not entail sum-ranking, it is
plausible that if pleasure and the absence of pain is the sole ultimate
value, then since more of it is better than less, the value of states of
affairs should be determined by the amount of happiness they contain.
More important for present purposes is the relation between
hedonism and consequentialism. If pleasure and the absence of pain are
the sole ultimate values (or the only morally relevant ultimate values),
then all (moral) value adheres in states of affairs, and what morality
requires is that we produce those states of affairs with the greatest
possible value. It is, of course, a further question whether these states of
affairs are to be thought of as including actions, which may contribute to
their value, or whether actions should be held to have no value in
themselves and can be morally significant only insofar as they produce
something of value. Sen refers to the latter position as involving `an
arbitrary exclusion' (Sen, 1982, p. 29). He writes, `Had welfarism not
been additionally imposed, consequentialism could have coexisted with
taking note of such things as the values and disvalues of actions through
the valuation of the states, which include these actions' (Sen, 1985,
p. 182).
There are, however, two factors at work here, which should be
distinguished. The first is that a particular conception of value, according
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to which actions in themselves have no value, can support an interpreta-
tion of `state of affairs' which excludes actions and includes only their
valuable consequences. If pleasure and pain are understood simply as
particular kinds of sensations or experiences then hedonism has this
consequence, since actions in themselves will have no value apart from
the experiences they produce. But this is not the most plausible form of
hedonism. In a more plausible form, happiness and even pleasure have
to be understood in a way that includes taking pleasure in doing things
and recognizes that the good that is at issue in such cases involves the
activity essentially, not simply as a means of producing an experience or
sensation of pleasure.1 A similar point holds in the case of Welfarism. If
welfare is understood simply as a state that actions can produce, then
Welfarism may seem to exclude actions as determinants of value. But if
welfare is a matter of preference satisfaction, and people have prefer-
ences about which actions they perform, then Welfarism can recognize
that actions can be valuable ± can contribute to the value of states of
affairs of which they are a part ± in the same sense in which anything
else, such as particular experiences, can.
But, whether actions can have value or not, and whether they
therefore should or should not be taken into account in determining the
value of states of affairs, the aims of Foundational Consequentialism
dictate that at least the deontic values of actions ± their rightness or
wrongness, whether or not they violate rights and so on ± should not be
included as determinants of the value of states of affairs. This is the
second factor I mentioned above. It is one thing to include, as a
determinant of the value of a state of affairs, the fact that it includes an
action that an agent would much prefer not to have performed; but it is
something else again to take into account the fact that this action was
wrong, or violated someone's right.
Sen observes that `Some ethical theories (like utilitarian ethics) insist
. . . that nonutility features, such as actions, must not be considered to be
of any value or disvalue on their own (rather, only for the utilities or
disutilities that they generate). But since there are good reasons to be
concerned about some of these features, such as actions, motives, and the
like (for reasons that are close enough to those which move deontolo-
gists, among others, to take note of them, in their own special way) the
utilitarian exclusion ends up being an arbitrary exclusion of a class of
reasoned demands' (Sen, 2000, pp. 487±88).
Restricting the evaluation of states of affairs in this way may be a
mistake, and it may be unfair for critics of consequentialism to insist on
1 Here I correct an oversimplification in my earlier presentation of these ideas (Scanlon
1998, pp. 100±101). The point is made clearly by Bernard Williams. (Smart and Williams,
1973, pp. 84±5).
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attacking this less plausible, welfarist version of the doctrine. But the
restriction may also reflect certain assumptions which, although they
may be mistaken, do not seem arbitrary. These are, first, that the
consequentialism in question, utilitarianism, is a version of Foundational
Consequentialism; second, that the values of such things as actions and
their motivational bases could only be moral values; and, third, that
including these in the valuation of states of affairs would therefore be in
conflict with the explanatory aims of the doctrine.
Sen departs from the narrowest model of consequentialism in a way
that involves rejecting these assumptions. He includes actions as parts of
the states of affairs that are to be evaluated, and he believes that part of
this evaluation should take into account whether they involve people's
rights being violated. This indicates, I believe, that what he is drawn to is
not Foundational Consequentialism but rather a version of Representa-
tional Consequentialism. This brings us to the question of why one
should find this doctrine appealing. Why should it be an advantage to
represent rights, duties and other deontic notions in terms of the value of
outcomes, even if in so doing one does not explain them in terms of an
independent and allegedly clearer notion of value?
One class of reasons that might be offered for this are what I will call
reconciliationist. If one accepts the maximization of the value of out-
comes as a formal standard of rationality, then deontological constraints
will seem problematic if the form of practical reasoning that they involve
cannot be fitted within this framework. Showing that these values can be
adequately represented in terms of the values of states of affairs would
lay this objection to rest. More substantively, if one is attracted by the
idea that one should always act `for the best', then one might be troubled
by the fact that deontological constraints may sometimes require one to
act in ways that do not fit with this appealing axiom. It would allay this
objection if one could show that, substantively, the most satisfactory
understanding of what `the best' involves is one that removes this
apparent tension.
It is possible that Sen is moved by one of these aims. At least, I
believe that his reasons for being attracted to consequentialism are like
these (and different from some other possible sources of the view) in
flowing from a point of view that takes common sense morality,
including its apparently deontological components, seriously and seeks
to defend it. But his main reasons are, I believe, more straightforwardly
substantive and positive than the reconciliationist ones I have just listed.
He believes, I think, that quite apart from any need to reconcile common
sense morality with other demands, the best interpretation of familiar
moral notions themselves involves, at least in part, their inclusion as
factors that contribute to the value of states of affairs. In particular, he
believes that the best interpretation of rights involves this.
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Sen's first argument for this is based on the following example (Sen,
1982, pp. 7±19). Donna has discovered that a group of racists (`the
bashers') plan to ambush and beat Ali at an isolated spot where he is
going. In order to warn him, she must learn his destination, which she
can only do by breaking into the room of Charles, a friend of Ali's who
greatly values his privacy. Sen stipulates that, taking into account the
distress that this would cause Charles and the pleasure that the group of
bashers will get from beating up Ali, overall preference satisfaction
would be maximized by Donna's not breaking into Charles's room and
thus allowing the beating to occur. Nor would a view based on strict
deontological constraints permit the break in, he says, since it would
violate an important right of Charles's. Nonetheless, Sen believes that it
would be permissible for Donna to break into Charles's room in order to
warn Ali. The best way to explain this fact, he believes, is to take account
of the very significant negative value of a state of affairs in which Ali's
right not to be beaten is violated, and hence the positive value of
preventing this state of affairs from occurring. He concludes that the
kind of view that can best account for this case is what he calls a goal-
rights system ± one in which the value of states of affairs takes into
account the value of protecting rights and the disvalue of having them
violated.
It is, however, open to question whether an explanation of the case
along these lines really needs to appeal to the idea that Ali has a right not
to be beaten up. Given the stipulations Sen has made, it is clear that it
would not be sufficient to appeal merely to considerations of welfare,
understood as preference satisfaction. But there is quite a lot of space
between preference satisfaction on the one hand and the idea of a right
on the other. In this intermediate space, we might appeal simply to the
idea that it is a very bad thing for Ali if he is beaten, and that the
pleasure that the bashers will get from beating him is not of comparable
moral significance, even if there are a great number of them and they
will each enjoy it very much.
It might be claimed that the preference-independent moral signifi-
cance appealed to here just amounts to a right. But is this so? As Sen
himself goes on to point out, the case does not depend on the fact that
some agent or agents (the bashers) will inflict the injury on Ali. We could
as well assume that Donna has learned that there is an unexploded
bomb near where Ali is going, and that she needs to break into Charles's
room to get the telephone number where she can reach Ali to warn him.
So the right in question, if it is one, is not a right against other agents,
that they not harm him, but a right not to be deprived of certain
`functionings'. But again, why do we need to call this a right? We do
need to say that it is morally important to protect Ali against this injury.
But many things are morally important without being rights.
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Perhaps the idea is that something that could justify violating
Charles's right of privacy would have to be a right, since only a right can
`trump' another right. But this does not seem to me to be the best way of
looking at the matter. First, it does not seem true that only a right can
justify interfering with or abridging another right. Property rights, for
example, can be infringed when this is necessary for important public
purposes, even thought there is no right to the benefits involved, and I
believe that something similar is true of most rights, including rights to
privacy. Second, I do not think that the best way to understand these
cases, in which two rights appear to be in conflict, is to suppose that
rights have a certain moral `weights' and that what we are doing is
deciding whether one right is or is not `outweighed' by another (or by
some other competing consideration.) Rather, it seems to me that rights,
as we commonly understand them, have certain exceptions built into
them, and that it does not in general take another right to trigger these
exceptions. What we are doing in many `conflict' situations, I would
suggest, is not balancing rights off against one another but asking
whether one of these rights (the one that we are tempted to `violate') is
or is not best understood as allowing for an exception in cases of the
kind in question. (If the answer is `yes', then we are not, properly
speaking, violating the right even though we may be doing what it
would normally forbid.)2
To spell this out, consider an instrumental theory of rights, which
Sen considers at several points and sets aside (for example, in Sen, 1982,
p. 15) without, however, rejecting it. According to an instrumental
account, to claim that people have a certain right is to claim that they
have some important interest that can be adequately protected only if
others' freedom to act is constrained in certain ways. For example,
people have good reason to want to be able to count on having the use of
and certain forms of control over objects, and to be able to conduct parts
of their lives free from the scrutiny of strangers. So they need, and can
reasonably insist on, rights which constrain the freedom of others to take
their possessions, or to pry into their affairs. But we also recognize that
absolute prohibitions against interfering in these ways would be
unacceptably costly to others. So, in order to be defensible, rights have to
be understood as admitting of exceptions. In deciding whether a
defensible right would have to incorporate a certain exception, we must
take into account not only the relative seriousness of the interests in
question (the interest that the right is meant to protect and the interest
that would be sacrificed without the exception) but also the degree to
2 In Judith Thomson's helpful terminology (Thomson, 1990, p. 122), the right is infringed
but not violated.
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which the secure protection that the right is meant to provide would be
undermined by an exception of the kind in question.
I am suggesting, then, that in cases like those in which Sen suggests
we must consider rights as goals, what we are actually taking as `to be
promoted' are the underlying interests which rights protect, and in terms
of which they are justified. But we are at the same time, I believe,
considering these interests within the framework of the right understood
as a constraint ± a limitation on our freedom to act ± that is justified in
the instrumental way just described. We are asking whether the
instrumental rationale embodied in the right does or does not admit of
an exception in cases like the one at hand. So, for example, in the case of
Donna, Charles, and Ali, the question is whether someone in Ali's
position could reasonably reject a version of the right to privacy that
would not permit Donna to break into Charles's room if this were the
only way to prevent Ali from being seriously injured. Ali's interest in not
suffering this injury figures in this analysis not as a right but as a
consideration that goes into determining the structure of Charles's right.
I have so far been examining one reason that Sen advances for
including actions in general, and right-violating actions in particular, as
components of states of affairs in a consequentialist (or consequence-
sensitive) theory. A second reason he sees for doing this is that a system
of moral thinking that has this form has the morally appealing property
of requiring agents to take responsibility for their actions (and the
consequences of these actions) in the proper way. He illustrates this (Sen,
2000, pp. 480ff.) with an episode from the Mahabharata in which Arjuna,
on the eve of a great battle against the forces of a usurper, bemoans the
fact that in the coming battle, although his cause is just and victory is
likely, multitudes will be killed, and he himself will have to kill many,
including people of whom he is very fond. Arjuna wonders whether it is
worth it, whether it would not be better to let the usurpers take over
without a battle. Against this, Krishna urges the `deontological' position
that since Arjuna's cause is just it is his duty to fight, `whatever the
consequences'.
Sen finds Arjuna's reluctance morally more appealing than the
harsher deontology defended by Krishna. He takes this case to illustrate
two important points. First, that a morally adequate assessment of a state
of affairs must take into account the actions that it involves (Arjuna is
right to care about the fact that he will be killing these people.) Second,
that states of affairs have different values when evaluated from different
`positions' (the fact that Arjuna himself will have killed people he is fond
of makes the coming state of affairs worse when judged from his position
as agent than it would be when judged from the point of view of a
neutral third party, who would have reason to regard the deaths as a bad
thing, but would not him or herself be involved in bringing them about).
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In this particular case, including actions as part of the states of affairs
to be evaluated and conducting this evaluation in a `position-relative'
way appears to favor Arjuna's more `consequentialist' position over
Krishna's `deontological' one. But in other cases, Sen believes that these
features of his consequence-sensitive view enable it to account for much,
if not all, of what anti-consequentialists such as Nagel and Williams
want to insist on under the heading of `agent-relative reasons'.
Merely attaching an agent-neutral negative value to the occurrence
of states of affairs involving rights violations would not achieve this
result. For (assuming sum-ranking) one would then always be required
to commit a right-violating act, no matter how heinous, if doing so were
the only way to prevent several similar right-violations from being
committed by others. This would not even be a dilemma on such a view;
it would be obvious what one should do.
Position-relative evaluation takes us farther than this. Just as Arjuna
is right to attach special negative value to the prospect of his having to
kill many people, so Jim, in Williams's well-known example,3 would be
correct to attach special negative value to his killing one of the villagers.
In order to justify Jim's refusing the role offered to him, the special
negative value attached to killing would have to be very great, and Sen
seems to me to leave it open whether it could be taken to be this large.
But the position-relative view at least allows us to see why this case
presents a dilemma. Indeed, it would seem that position-relative agent
values might come in on both sides of the case, thus heightening the
dilemma. Jim needs to take into account not only the disvalue of his
killing one of the villagers but also, I would think, the disvalue of his less
direct involvement in the deaths of all ten villagers if he refuses. This
seems to be part of what it is for him to `take responsibility for the
consequences of his actions'. To simply say that the deaths of these others
was not his doing would be to side too firmly with Krishna.
This account is appealing, but I nonetheless want to raise a few
questions about it.4 First, as Sen points out, attaching a position-relative
3 Utilitarianism: For and Against, pp. 98±9.
4 In passages of mine that Sen quotes (Sen, 2000, pp. 498±91) I was making the point that
one cannot account for the intuitive wrongness of killing by attaching an agent-neutral
disvalue to the occurrence of such acts. In addition to the problem, mentioned above, that
on such a view it would be simply obvious that one should kill one to prevent several
killings by others, there is the further problem that the reason one person has not to kill is
not identical with the reason that anyone has to prevent a killing. On this, Sen and I agree,
and I also agree with him that deontological prohibitions do not exhaust the morality of
right and wrong (my point was just that an adequate theory should account for those
cases in which these prohibitions seem correct). Our disagreement is about whether the
best account of such cases is one based simply on position-relative evaluations of states of
affairs. In the remainder of this paper I explain why I believe that the best account is not of
this form.
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disvalue to rights-violating actions does not fully capture the kind of
constraints that deontologists have in mind. This seems clear to me
intuitively, but is more difficult to establish through plausible examples.
One kind of case that might bring out the non-equivalence would be a
situation in which you have set in motion some train of causes that will
kill five people unless you manage to prevent it from running its course,
but you can only do this by killing another person (Kamm, 1996,
pp. 239±43). Suppose, for example, that you have set a bomb, which will
kill five if it goes off. You then have second thoughts, but in order to
defuse the bomb in time you would have to kill another person, who is
in the way. Doing so would violate a deontological constraint against
killing, as this is normally understood. But it is not ruled out by a
position-relative disvalue of the kind that Sen proposes. In order to
defuse the bomb, you must bring about a state of affairs in which you
have killed an innocent person. But if you do not do this, then you will
have brought about a state of affairs in which you will have killed five.
The disvalue of the latter state of affairs, evaluated from your position as
agent, is surely at least as great as that of the former.
One might, of course, conclude that the intuition expressed in the
deontological constraint is mistaken, and that it is permissible to kill the
one in such a case. But the proposed analysis also has a further
implication that seems implausible. This is that it is permissible to kill
the one in such a case because otherwise you will have killed the five,
and that this would not be permissible (or would be less clearly
permissible) if someone else had set the bomb and you were the only
person in a position to defuse it. This seems mistaken: the fact that it was
you who set the bomb may mean that you have a special responsibility
to defuse it if you can, but it does not seem to affect the permissibility of
your killing an innocent person in order to do so.5
There is also another worry about this appeal to the idea of position-
relative disvalue. It is sometimes charged that people who, faced with a
choice like Jim's in Williams's example, refuse to kill for the sake of some
much greater good, are `keeping their hands clean' or `preserving their
own moral purity' at the expense of others. This charge seems to be
strengthened by the suggestion that the reason someone in this position
has to refuse to kill is the special disvalue, from his or her position, of a
state of affairs in which he or she will have killed someone. To fend off
this objection, one might stress that the idea that a state of affairs has
special disvalue when evaluated from a particular position should not be
identified with the idea that it is bad for the person in that position. But
what, then, does this special disvalue come to? If it consists simply in the
5 Kamm also mentions this point and the following one about `keeping your hands clean'
(Kamm, 1996, p. 243).
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fact that a person in that position has a special (non-self-interested)
reason not to bring it about, then this begins to look more like a moral
prohibition, albeit one that is not absolute.
Moreover, the charge of `preserving one's moral purity' brings out
another way in which it seems, intuitively, mistaken to explain the
wrongness of killing by appealing to the agent's objection to being a
killer. In the cases in which it seems clearest that it would be wrong to
kill one to save five, the wrongness of doing this seems to arise most
basically from a special claim of the victim, not to be killed. The problem
that these cases raise is how to reconcile this claim with the claims of
others to be saved. Insofar as the agent has a special reason not to kill in
such a case, this reason seems to derive from a resolution of this problem
rather than to be the factor that provides this resolution.
This does not mean, however, that position-relative reasons are not
real, or that they lack moral significance. Arjuna is right to regret not
only that many people he is fond of will be killed in the coming battle
but also, especially, that he will be the one who does much of the killing.
Any reasonably sensitive person would feel the same way. The reason in
question does not depend on any thought that what he will do will be
wrong ± he has reason to feel this way even if what he does will be
morally permissible, and even his duty. His reasons for regret derive not
from conceptions of right and wrong, but from the significance for his
relations with these people and their relatives, of his being the agent of
their harm.
On a contractualist view, position-relative reasons of this kind have
their most basic moral significance as factors that help to shape the
principles by which actions are judged. For example, because of the
special significance for an agent of being the direct cause of harm to a
friend or family member, or even of failing to save them, it would be
reasonable to reject principles that required us to be strictly neutral
between friends or family members and strangers ± for example, by
requiring one to flip a coin to decide between saving a friend and saving
a stranger. Position-relative values of the kind Sen identifies thus explain
why acceptable principles must incorporate what Scheffler called agent-
centered prerogatives.
In presenting this analysis, as in my earlier discussion of an
instrumental account of rights, I have slipped into a two-level form of
moral argument, consisting of one level at which actions are judged right
or wrong according to principles and another, more fundamental level, at
which these principles in turn are justified. (By contrast, the consequenti-
alism Sen discusses seems mostly to be of the `direct' variety, in which
actions are justified by direct appeal to their consequences.) But how are
principles to be justified in a two-level view? It may seem that at this more
fundamental level we areallconsequentialists, or at least that Iam one.
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Any acceptable process through which principles of action are
justified must at least be consequence-sensitive, to use Sen's term. It
must at least take consequences into account. If we go further with Sen
and insist, plausibly, that the grounds for evaluating consequences must
not be limited to individual welfare, but can include other things that
individuals have reason to care about, then what can be relevant in the
assessment of a principle other than the consequences for individuals of
its being generally adopted? I believe that the point of divergence here
between contractualism and consequentialism concerns not just what is
relevant but how it is taken into account.
Consequentialism, as I understand it, holds that, whatever view we
take of the overall goodness of states of affairs, we should employ that
notion of goodness as the ultimate basis for assessing actions: we should
perform the actions that would produce the best states of affairs, judged
by this standard (or, in a two-level view, the actions allowed by those
principles whose general observance would have such consequences).
By contrast, as a contractualist, I hold that in deciding which principles
should govern our actions we should consider not the overall value of
resulting states of affairs but the reasons that individuals have for
accepting or rejecting these principles. This means, first, that we consider
only the ways in which these principles would affect individuals, not
their impact on the realization of impersonal values; and second, that we
need to compare the distinctive reasons that individuals in different
positions have for objecting to a principle. These reasons will, as I have
just suggested above, be position-relative. For example, the reasons that
someone has to object to a principle from the position of an agent who
will be bound by it will not in general be the same as those that someone
has from the position of a victim, or an affected bystander.
Contractualism thus naturally employs position-relative reasons, but
does not require position-relative evaluations of overall states of the
world. This enables it to avoid a prima-facie problem that arises for a
position-relative consequentialist theory. If the consequentialist idea of
acting for the best is to provide a single standard of right action, it seems
to require a single idea of what is best as its evaluative basis. There is
thus a puzzle about how to formulate consequentialism on the basis of
multiple, position-relative evaluative standpoints. Perhaps it becomes
the view that what morality requires is for each person to act for the best,
as judged from his or her position. I will leave open the question of how
this is to be worked out. My point is that within a contractualist view the
problem does not arise. Contractualism does not require a single
standard of overall evaluation. What it requires is, rather, an account of
what various individuals, in virtue of their diverse positions, have
reason to want, and a way of comparing these reasons ± not by deciding
what is best overall but by comparing the importance of a particular
SEN AND CONSEQUENTIALISM 49http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 26 Jun 2009 IP address: 128.103.149.52
benefit from one position with the importance of a burden from some
other position.
So, whether position-relative evaluation can be incorporated within
a consequentialist theory or not, and whether or not it provides what is
needed to make such a theory fit more easily with common sense
morality, position-relative reasons have an important to role to play in a
contractualist theory. By taking them into account, such a theory can
accommodate a number of the points that Sen's discussion of position-
relativity calls to our attention.
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